News and Events Involving Environmental Law, Published by Chicago Environmental Attorney Dave Scriven-Young
of Peckar & Abramson, P.C. -- (312) 239-9722

Pollution Control Board Grants Summary Judgment Against Defendants Charged with Contaminating Land with PCB Waste

The Illinois Pollution Control Board recently issued an opinion granting summary judgment in favor of the State and against the defendants in People v. Ward, Case No. PCB 10-72.  This case dealt with contaminated soil at a residence located at 202 Fackney Street, Carmi, White County, Illinois.  The State alleged that defendant Timothy James transported six electrical transformers, given to him by defendant Byrom Ward, d/b/a Ward Electric, to the residence.  James then spilled approximately 60 gallons of Polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB)-laden oil onto the ground of his residence.  Illinois EPA conducted an  inspection of the residence and collected oil samples from the transformers.  The results indicated that five of the transformers contained oil with PCB concentrations ranging from 260 ug/kg2 to 5,600,000 ug/kg.  IEPA also collected soil samples that revealed that the soil in the backyard of the James residence and the pickup truck containing the transformers were contaminated by PCBs.

The State’s complaint alleged that the defendants violated the Illinois Environmental Protection Act by (1) “caus[ing] or allow[ing] the open dumping of refuse and waste at the James residence”, (2) “disposing or abandoning wastes at a site that does not meet the requirements of the Act”, and (3) “causing or allowing the open dumping of refuse and waste in a manner that resulted in litter.”  The State requested that the Pollution Control Board order the defendants to cease and desist from any further violations and pay civil penalties.

The defendants failed to respond to the complaint and also failed to respond to the State’s motion for summary judgment.  Therefore, under the rules of the Pollution Control Board, the allegations in the complaint were deemed admitted by the defendants, and the Court granted the motion for summary judgment.  The Court will impose a civil penalty on the defendants after court briefs have been filed by the parties.

This case should serve as a reminder to all companies or individuals notified of potential violations of environmental laws–don’t try to avoid the issue and make sure that you respond to the complaint!  An experienced attorney may be able to help reduce your liability and penalty, even if you think that you are liable for an environmental problem.

Stay tuned to the Illinois Environmental Law Blog for more news and developments.  To set up a free initial consultation to discuss your legal matter, please contact Chicago environmental attorney Dave Scriven-Young at (312) 239-9722 or dscriven-young@pecklaw.com.





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    The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently upheld the federal government’s ability to criminally prosecute environmental activists who destroy property under the federal Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (“AETA”).

    In United States v. Johnson, the defendants travelled from Los Angeles, California to a mink farm in Morris, Illinois. The mink farm was in the business of breeding, raising, and selling minks to fur manufacturers. At the mink farm, the defendants released approximately 2000 minks from their cages. They also removed portions of the fence surrounding the mink farm to help the minks escape, and they destroyed the minks’ breeding cards, which were needed to sell the minks to a furrier. In addition, they poured caustic substances on two farm vehicles and spray-painted the words “Liberation is Love” on a barn. The vandalism caused between $120,000 and $200,000 worth of damage. The defendants then began traveling to a fox farm in Roanoke, Illinois, which bred foxes to sell to fur manufacturers. They planned to damage the fox farm as well, but they were arrested by local law enforcement before they arrived at the fox farm. The defendants were charged in state court with possession of burglary tools and were convicted. They were sentenced to 30 months imprisonment.

    Then, the defendants were charged with violating the AETA by the federal government. Count I of the indictment alleged that they conspired to travel in interstate commerce for the purpose of damaging and interfering with the operation of an animal enterprise, and in connection with that purpose, damaged the property of an animal enterprise. Count II alleged that the defendants damaged real and personal property used by an animal enterprise. The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment against them, asserting that the AETA was facially overbroad, was unconstitutionally vague, and violated substantive due process because it labeled persons who committed the act as “terrorists”. The District Court denied the motion to dismiss.

    The Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling that rejected all of the defendants’ arguments. In particular, the defendants suggested that the AETA prohibited advocacy that caused damage to only intangible property such as profits or goodwill. The court rejected that argument and held that the AETA prohibited destruction of or damage to tangible items and property owned by the animal enterprise. In fact, the court looked at the legislative history of the AETA, which reinforced the conclusion that it was not intended to criminalize speech or expressive conduct that caused damage only to the animal enterprise’s profits or goodwill. Several legislators made statements indicating that, while the statute was being passed to combat the violence being perpetrated against animal enterprises as well as people and entities connected to animal enterprises, Congress was aware of the importance of protecting the First Amendment right to engage in lawful protest against animal enterprises. In particular, the court looked at a speech by Senator Feinstein stating: “I fully recognize that peaceful picketing and public demonstrations against animal testing should be recognized as part of our valuable and sacred right to free expression. For this reason, all conduct protected by the First Amendment is expressly excluded from the scope of this legislation. This law effectively protects the actions of the law-abiding protester while carefully distinguishing the criminal activity of extremists.” In summary, the court found that the text of the statute as well as the legislative history made clear that the statute does not criminalize speech or expressive conduct that causes damage only to intangible profits or goodwill of an animal enterprise.

    The Seventh Circuit had an easy task in this case, deciding to interpret the statute to criminalize destructive conduct but keeping the door open to reasonable protests that do not harm private property. Environmental activists need to be aware of this line in the sand that has been drawn by Congress and the courts.
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    2 weeks ago  ·  

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